







11111I 1lil1 1 1
3 9080 00736841 5
FREEDOM, POWER AND DEVELOPMENT:
ETHICAL ISSUES IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
BY
Prof. Lucian W. Pye
Department of Political Science, MIT
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
___I~_ 1~1_ __ ~g~Q~~_~ ~qs~ __~_;~===~_riir=Esl~=~==;~r~-ri~n~- -- _I
I
I ,
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
COMMUNICATIONS FORUM
FREEDOM, POWER AND DEVELOPMENT:
ETHICAL ISSUES IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
BY
Prof. Lucian W. Pye
Department of Political Science, MIT
This paper was presented, October 5, 1988, as the inaugral lecture
of the Frank Stanton/Andrew Heiskell Center for Public Policy in
Telecommunications and Information Systems, The City University of
New York.
FREEDOM, POWER AND DEVELOPMENT:
ETHICAL ISSUES IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
by
Lucian W. Pye
I feel it a great honor to have been invited to present the Inaugural
Lecture launching The City University of New York's Frank Stanton/Andrew
Heiskell Center for Public Policy in Telecommunications and Informations
Systems. When I was asked to deliver this lecture I was moved by the
prospect of publicly acknowledging my respect for the memory of my
esteemed colleague and close friend, Ithiel de Sola Pool. I am confident
that this new Center will be a great success, for it is starting on the
right foot by recognizing that Ithiel Pool set the standards of scholarship
for all who would work in the field of communications, and most
particularly on the issues of freedom of expression in our society.
I must confess, however, that when I began to put my thoughts
together on what I should say today I came close to panic. How could I
possibly come close to doing justice to the extraordinary legacy Ithiel
Pool left us in the huge field of communications research. He pioneered in
every conceivable aspect of communications research -- from the early use
of content analysis and the charting of the changing symbols employed by
different elites, to the application of survey research and polling in
designing strategies for political campaigns; he advanced our understanding
of how attitudes and opinions are formed, and how individual psychology and
sociological processes interact to establish climates of opinion. Finally,
he took on the challenge of illuminating the legal issues of freedom of
speech raised by the impact of the modern electronic technologies of
communications. In doing this he was guided by his over-riding faith that
advances in communications technologies would inevitably work to expand the
domain of freedom and not, as Orwell had it, to strengthen the potential
for totalitarian authority.
I remember once asking Ithiel why he had taken such an interest in
communications, which in the discipline of political science is a rather
specialized and often overlooked sub-field. He replied that communications
was a wonderful rubric under which one could freely utilize all of the
social sciences, for all human behavior involves in one way or another
communication. Ithiel Pool saw the study of communications as providing an
opportunity to move in many directions with high spirits, unlimited
curiosity, and a strong sense of moral responsibility. Indeed, for all of
his fascinations with the new technologies, Ithiel was, in my judgment,
motivated more by a deep appreciation of the ethical problems raised by
those communications advances.
Yet, concern for ethical matters never dampened his wry sense of
humor. Once when Ithiel was about to leave for Washington to testify before
a Congressional committee on the psychological effects of television
violence on young children, I irreverently asked him, "What do you think
the congressmen would make of it if they knew that you don't have a TV set
in your own house?" He replied, "Oh, they would probably understand that
among Cambridge intellectuals it is still impossible to admit to having a
television set, and if one should get one it would probably be necessary to
keep it in the bedroom where you do other things that you don't talk
about."
Since it would be hard for anyone, and certainly for me, to do
justice to the full field of communications research, as defined by Ithiel
Pool, I have decided to limit my remarks to three problem areas, and even
on these I shall barely be able to scratch the surface. I believe, however,
'that this should be acceptable since my real purpose is to suggest that
there is a great deal of exciting work that awaits study, and that
communications research will call for a wide variety of skills, and the
collaboration of people from many parts of the university.
The three areas are: First, the relationship of communications
technology and political freedom which was the subject of Ithiel's last and
truly great book.1  I could have devoted the entire lecture to this urgent
subject, but I have resisted the temptation because I recogize that it is
far wiser for me just to set the stage for the two distinguished
commentators who will follow me and whose knowledge and authority on this
subject far exceed my limited abilities. Second, this being an election
year, I felt that some attention should be given to the topic of the
influence of the media on public opinion, and more particularly, the issue
of possible ideological bias on the part of the media. Third, there is the
important policy area of communications and political development in the
Third World, a topic on which Ithiel and I once worked together.
It might seem that these three topics will be taking us off in three
totally different directions, but I think not. For I believe that they are
held together by a common central theme. This theme is that we, as a
society, have been astonishingly alert in recognizing that we are somehow
caught up in a profound communications revolution. We have not been
insensitive to the advances in technology, and we have even tried to
respond to what we thought were the social, economic, and political
implications of the new technologies. Yet, and this is the burden of my
argument, we have consistently taken a far too narrow reading of the
implications of the new technologies, and therefore we have failed to
respond to what in fact are the much more fundamental developments we have
been living through. In a very real sense we have been like the blind
wisemen and the elephant in that we have consistently gotten only a part of
the story right and we have missed the larger scheme of things.
This has had profound implications for the management of our public
life. Profound, precisely because in all societies thoughout time the
communications process is basic in shaping the structure and character of
politics. In our case, we have gone from having a politics based on the
print media, in which the choice of words, the development of ideas, and
the preservation of the record were dominant concerns, and we have entered
a new world of politics based on television, that is, a politics of
imagery, sound bites, and thoughts that are, according to George Will, no
more than "ideological lint." With television politics the sole reality is
the present moment, without the perspective of recorded memories. People
complain about the election campaigns of 1988, blaming the candidates, when
in fact their frustrations stem more from the fact that we are now living
in the new world of television politics. Our politics is that of headlines
and not deep and well crafted arguments about policies. Memory is out, and
the vivid imagery of the nightly newscast takes over. The use of code words
has replaced "talking politics," and our memories are those of a blur of
images, at best the sensation of a vaguely recalled series of movies.
Let us see how we came to this state of affairs. It is a story of how
we have over the years strived to do right, but too often we have failed to
grasp the full import of what we were confronted with in the advances of
communications technology.
Technology Races Ahead, But Policies Can't Keep Up.
It has for some time been commonplace to extol the wonders of the
technological revolution that is obliterating distance and making the
world, as the cliche goes, a global village. If it were not for the drag on
our thinking we should be entering an era in which long distance calls
should cost no more than calls across town. The electronic revolution has
brought a proliferation in the ways that people can communicate with each
other and obtain information from multiple sources without leaving home.
Ithiel Pool was able to position himself at the cutting edge of the
scientific advances in electronics and then to imagine, with concrete
vividness, the social and legal problems that would probably accompany such
technological advances. In some respects his book is more important now
than when it was first published because what were his speculations at the
time of writing have now become our realities. It is therefore important
for other researchers to follow up his leads so that we can intellectually
stay ahead of events.
Viewed purely in engineering terms, all these advances in technology
would seem to multiply man's freedoms and enhance the possibilities for
creative individual development. Paradoxically, as Ithiel Pool's
pathbreaking book documents, governments have tended to misinterpret the
social implications of advances in communications technology, and to assume
that the nature of the innovations requires state regulations which have
often led to restrictions on freedom of expression. For most Americans the
First Amendment is sacred, for we believe that it guarantees freedom of
speech for all of us, but in practice the First Amendment has only been
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applied unqualifiedly to the print media. Because of the initial
perceptions about the later technologies, the First Amendment has not been
equally applied to communications based on each subsequent advance in the
electronic media.
The invention of the telephone and the telegraph set the stage for
governmental deviations from First Amendment principles. At the time this
seemed reasonable because those inventions raised the specter of monopoly
and the possibility of discrimination toward different users. Would it not
be possible for those who strung the wires, the Bell System and Western
Union, to favor some customers over others, and therefore was it not right
and proper for the government to regulate their use according to the
principles governing common carriers, much as was done in the case of the
railroads? So the reasoning went.
The advent of radio and television also involved new technologies
which on the face of it seemed to call for some degree of governmental
regulation. Without regulation would not anarchy rule the air waves? Some
authority surely had to allocate radio frequencies and television channels.
Shouldn't government step in and see that confusion was avoided and
fairness was being done?
As a result of these historical developments, the spirit of freedom
associated with the First Amendment was compromised by the presumed
imperatives inherent in the new technologies of communication. As a result
there emerged in America a confusing pattern of controls and freedoms which
have increasingly failed to make sense. We have now ended up with three
distinct models for public policies dealing with communications. First,
there is the print model in which the First Amendment remains sacred so
that it is still unthinkable for the government to-attempt to regulate
newspapers, journals and the publishing industry. Second, there is the
common carrier model in which the government is called upon to intervene,
in theory, to insure that there is no discrimination in providing access to
all. This was the model that accompanied the invention of the telephone and
the telegraph; Western Union and AT&T were seen as essentially monopolies
and in order that they not use their wires to favor some and harm others
the government was given the right to set rates and provide general policy
guidance. Third, there is the broadcasting model in which the government
licenses private owners and in the process establishes rules and standards
as to what can and cannot be said or shown, actions that would be
unthinkable if they were applied to the print media.
Distinctions Without Differences.
Whatever the virtues of these later models at the time they were
initiated, it seems that with the continuing advances in technology they
have now become increasingly confusing and at times a threat to freedom.
This is because innovations in technology have largely eliminated the
distinctions that initially set apart the various forms of communications.
The problems are very real. For example, a former chairman of the FCC
recently raised the question as to whether a newspaper delivered by teletex
is an extension of print and thus as free as any other newspaper, or is it
a form of broadcast which thus could be brought under the control of
government.
The theory that public policy should be guided by apparent
differences in technologies began, as we have said, with the invention of
the telegraph and the telephone. The "common carrier" idea was not
a basic threat to freedom, but it did produce over time some absurdities as
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policy sought to maintain differences that no longer existed. For example,
the requirement that AT&T and Western Union each be regulated in its
separate domain has brought us to the ridiculous situation we have today in
which, for example, to send a telegram from Boston to New York one dials a
1-800 number to tell the message to a so-called "telegraph" operator who is
in, say, Chicago or Atlanta or New Jersey, who then simply dials the New
York number and repeats the message. Since the distinction between the
"telephone" and the "telegraph" has become essentially an artificial one,
why are we left with a situation in which we can send money only by
"telegraph" -- i.e. Western Union, and not by "telephone", i.e. AT&T or any
of its competitors?
The FCC has apparently on several occasions wanted to make
appropriate changes in regulations that would have been consistent with
Pool's recommendations. For example, on July 21, 1988, that agency
suggested that telephone companies should in certain cases be allowed to
supply cable television on their telephone wires - a suggestion that
should be welcomed by all who are tired of having their streets torn up
time and again, but which was upsetting to some cable companies, and hence
to the staffs of key congressmen and senators. In the field of
communications policy we continue to pretend that decisions should be
quided by the myth that technologies have an inherent and hence impartial
logic to them, when in fact policy decisions are the product of interest
group competition. This pretense produces a situation in which political
power is often more decisive than appeals to the principles of free speech
in determining communications policy.
The Serious Challenge to the First Amendment
The advent of radio and television produced more than just some
absurdities of logic, it produced a direct threat to the First Amendment
principle. Again, the problem started with the idea that the nature of the
technologies required modifications of the general principles of freedom of
expression. In time, however, it has become apparent that there are really
no technological problems, but there is instead the inertia of established
law. The result is that today a major issue of communications policy is
whether the trend in the future will be toward expanding the application of
the First Amendment model to cover as much as possible of electronic
communications, or will the licensing powers of government associated with
the broadcasting model dominate so as to threaten the spirit of the print
model? Jerome Barron, one of the earliest writers to note that there is no
essential difference between print and broadcast communications, came to
the conclusion in a 1967 Harvard Law Review article that because of the
dangers of concentration of ownership the broadcast model of licensing
should be applied to newspapers, thereby taking away the rights long
associated with the freedom of the press.2 Lee Bollinger, writing in a
1976 Michigan Law Review article, came to the rather novel but somewhat
vacuous judgment that, although there there are no basic differences in the
two modes of communications, it is still good to have separate policies
since this has given the country "the best of two worlds" - some freedoms
and some constraints.3
Let us go bak and briefly review how it came about that the First
Amendment was not automatically applied to broadcasting. It seems that with
the advent of radio, the American legal system quickly determined that
there was a problem of "spectrum scarcity" which called for licensing by
the government, and Congress readily agreed by establishing the Federal
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Radio Commission, the forerunner of the FCC. What was in retrospect
astonishing was the speed with which the courts and the Commission
concluded that the differences in technology also justified totally
different standards of evaluation. The Supreme Court took it as
self-evident that radio was "entertainment" and since entertainment is not
entitled to First Amendment protection, neither was radio. In its second
annual report in 1928 the Federal Radio Commission stated that it was
"unable to see that the guarantee of free speech has anything to do with
entertaining programs as such," and thus for radio the First Amendment was
irrelevent. V.O.Key, the eminent political scientist, wrote that the owners
of broadcasting stations were "lineal descendents of operators of music
halls and peep shows.,"4
The idea that radio was "entertainment" was soon supplanted by the
more earnest doctrines which held that because of "spectrum scarcity"
government should regulate broadcasting, first, in the "public interest"
and then to insure "fairness." In the 1920s certain abiding principles of
communications law which are antithetical to freedom evolved out of a
series of bizarre cases. It would seem that in this field of American legal
history some cases, involving ludicrous events and comical facts, ended up
producing some lasting but questionable legal principles. Thus the
principle that radio should be licensed according to the government's
concept of the "public interest" stemmed from a landmark case involving a
Dr. John R. Brinkley of Milford, Kansas, who claimed that he was a graduate
of what he called the "Eclectric Medical University."
On getting control of radio station KFKB at Junction City, a few
miles down a dirt road from his home, this entrepreneurial doctor jacked up
the power of the station so that it could blanket much of America from the
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Rocky Mountains to the Appalachians and thereby reach possibly the largest
audience of any station in the America of the 1920s. Delighted with his
new-found powers, he was soon exploiting the air waves to reach gullible
males who were worried about their declining sexual powers. He called upon
them to come to Milford where he would implant the gonads of a goat into
their scrotums. At first they were expected to bring their own goat, but as
business grew, Dr. Brinkley established his own herd of 750 billy goats
from which the naive patients could pick one of their own liking. The "goat
doctor" as he came to be called, was soon moving on to providing quack
treatments for other male health anxieties, which we in the liberated 1980s
still find it embarrassing to speak of in public, but which Dr. Brinkley
graphically described over the air waves. The Kansas Medical Association
was indignant and demanded an end to his fraudulant activities, but he
fought back, proclaiming to his huge radio audience that most established
doctors should not just be sued but should be jailed for malpractice. To
get back at his tormentors, and to cash in on his slick skills with the
microphone, Dr. Brinkley ran for governor, and possibly would have won had
not the entrenched Republican Party stuffed enough ballot boxes to beat
him. The Federal Radio Commission then stepped in and refused to grant a
renewal of station KFKB's license, thereby establishing the principle that
licensing should be based on the "public interest." 5
That principle, which would have been abhorent to the print media,
was soon reinforced by the Supreme Court's enunciation of the "fairness
doctrine" for the broadcast media. This docrtine came out of the Red Lion
cases involving another set of quirky characters. What happened here was
that a Reverend Billy James Hargis, who regularly purchased 15 minutes of
air time from the local station in Red Lion, Pennsylvania, took delight in
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passionately attacking a liberal writer, Fred Cook. Mr. Cook took umbrage
and demanded that the station give him free time to answer. The Supreme
Court decreed that such were his rights, and so was established the
fairness doctrine whereby broadcasters must give equal time to contrary
opinions.
As we have said, the rationale for licensing broadcasting grew out of
the false notion that there is a serious problem of "spectrum scarcity"
dictated by the nature of technology, and therefore, in the words of
Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion of another landmark case,
"Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to
all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes
of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation."6 But is it
really true that it is easier to establish a newspaper than to set up a
radio station? Any group of bright high school physics students would
certainly find it far easier to put together a radio broadcasting facility
than to publish a newpaper capable of reaching an equal size audience. In
Boston we have more than fifty radio stations and only two newspapers, and
we could have many more radio stations were it not for the cost of the
necessary license.
It is the licensing process and not the nature of air waves that
creates whatever scarcity there may be. Licensing also creates the
possibility for abuses as to what is or is not in the "public interest."
The analogy with the licensing of taxis comes to mind: the controls by the
licensing process means that in New York medallions now cost a small
fortune, but as for ensuring that standards are upheld -- I must ask, what
standards? The cabs are often filthy, seemingly without springs, and the
drivers are generally scruffy, and many are unable to speak intelligible
~-- --- :I--- --r·-`~.rr;.s
English. Recently in Washington, when I asked to be taken me to National
Airport, the driver replied, "Where's that?"
At a time when there is dramatic convergence in the modes of
communications the effort to maintain the distinctions in regulations by
technology seems increasingly anachronistic. For example, when the norm in
American cities is more and more to have only one or at best two newspapers
but a large number of television channels, does it still make sense to
prevent cross-ownership of the broadcast media by struggling newspaper
publishers? The FCC seems to have sensed this problem in the case of
Rupert Murdock's ownership in New York of the Post and a television station
and in Boston of the Herald and a small TV station. Yet, Senators Hollings
and Kennedy saw it differently, and used their legislative powers to
prevent any such cross-ownership.
Another area in which the competing models for communications policy
seems to be rubbing against the ideals of freedom is the Fairness Doctrine
that governs broadcasting but not news print. In the 1941 Mayflower
Doctrine, which was based on the idea of broadcasting being a monopoly, the
FCC held that "radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only when
devoted to the communication of information and the exchange of ideas
fairly and objectively presented," and that "freedom of speech on the radio
must be broad enough to provide full and equal opportunity for the
presentation to the public of all sides of public issues." Who is to be the
judge of "fairness"? The government, of course. And, needless to say,
government would never be tolerated as the dictator of the editorial
opinions in newspapers. Is the public best served by having the FCC decide
what is fairness, or is it not better to have, as John Milton argued, open
competition of ideas? For as he said," Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple;
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whoever knew Truth put to worse in a free and open encounter."7
Newspapers and Television News Are Not the Same.
To argue that broadcasting should be brought under the First
Amendment principles that are applied to the print media is not to say that
there are no differences in the social and political consequences of these
different modes of communcations. In managing news coverage, for example,
there are major differences between the newspapers and television,
differences which, as we shall see, have produced a radical and not
entirely welcomed revolution in the character of American politics, and
especially our style of election campaigning.
In the newspaper world it is possible to have reporters assigned
throughout the world and to have their stories flow into the different city
desks where editiors can quickly scan what has come in and decide which
stories deserve the front page, which should get less prominence, and which
can be ignored. The result is newspapers can in a sense mirror of what has
been going on in the world. Television cannot operate this way because it
would be impossible to manage in any twenty-four hours all of the film
clips that might be filed by "correspondents." Instead, in television it is
the editors who instruct camera crews what events to cover. Often this has
meant that the evening news is based on decisions taken in the morning by
editors who have scanned the morning newspapers for the main stories of the
day. Instead of being a mirror, television is a spotlight, guided by people
who are essentially following the headlines of the day.
The result, of course, is the lack of depth that we associate with
the print news. This has consequences for national politics because we know
that the Amertican public has shifted from relying upon newpapers to
getting their information on politics mainly from television. The full
implications of this public dependence upon television for knowledge is
something we shall return to in a moment. We need only raise the question
here as to whether television news has to be as superficial and as oriented
to headlines and to imagery as it now is. It seems that it should be
possible to have fewer stories and greater depth. Indeed, on many Mondays
there is a reversal of roles, as when the press reports what happened on
such television programs as Face the Nation, and Meet the Press. We also
have the example of the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour. Some may complain that
such in-depth television is boring, but if there was more competition in
the spirit of the free press, and less constraints by the "fairness
doctrine", the result would probably be not only greater diversity but
livelier programming.
The Power and the Responsibility of the Media.
Even while advocating an expansion of the First Amendment to cover
the broadcasting media, we need to recognize that it does not provide an
automatic formula for solving all issues of freedom and technology in
communications. Even within the domain of the print media there will always
be complex questions that deserve the careful attention of scholars. For
example, in July of this year (1988) a jury in Minnesota had to decide
whether The Minneapolis Star Tribune and The St. Paul Pioneer Press
Dispatch were, as they claimed, protected by the First Amendement or
whether the two jointly owned papers were guilty of breach of contract when
they published the name of an informant to whom their reporter had promised
anonymity. They found that the First Amendment should not apply, and the
judge ordered the papers to pay $700,000 to the man, who had lost his job
because of the story. There will of course be appeals as the legal process
tries to sort out the differences between the freedom of the press to
report all relevant facts and the obligations of newspapers to honor
contracts.
This particular case also raises the question of the propriety of the
increasingly common practice of the press of using unidentified sources,
and publishing reports which quote unnamed "officials" who may or may not
exist in fact. The press has long contended that the First Amendment
protects reporters from having to reveal, even to grand juries, the names
of confidential sources. In practice this approach opens the door to
fictitious "sources," and it is one of many reasons for the decline in
recent years in the credibility of the media in the minds of a majority of
Americans. Apparently the two Minnesota newspapers felt that they should
reveal the name of the informant in order to maintain their credibility.
More generally the problem of confidentiality of sources has become
troublesome because of the increasingly artful use of "leaks," which at
times raises the question of who is using whom in the relationships of
government and the press in Washington. Politicians have learned numerous
other ways of manipulating the media to their advantage. Some, for example,
have developed skill in setting the scene for television so that the
representatives of the media will appear to be treating them in a rude and
aggresive fashion. The politicians know, and the media are fast learning,
that in American political culture there is general contempt for people
who engage in heckling, and the victims of hecklers can usually win instant
sympathy. Thus the power of television can be turned against it.
The Power of the Media and the Possibilities of Biases.
This brings us to the second area I wish to touch upon, the question
of the political influences of the media and the problems of possible
ideological bias. The issues about the power and the responsibilities of
the news media are murky largely because it is generally understood that in
some respects the media collectively constitute a fourth branch of
government, but since they are also protected by the First Amendment they
are not a part of the normal processes of checks and balances which
constrain and discipline the three traditional branches of government.
Uncertainty and ambivalence about the power and responsibilities of
the media have led to a perverse development with respect to the First
Amendment that should be the cause for concern for all who are dedicated to
the cause of freedom. Initially the First Amendment was seen as a shield
protecting a vulnerable press from the massive powers of the state, thereby
insuring that citizens would always have the right to freely express their
opinions. In recent years, however, as the media have become huge
commercial enterprises the amendment has come to be seen by some as
contributing to the media's posture of arrogant self-righteousness, which
in turn has caused the American public, according to some polls, to be even
more distrustful of the media than of their elected politicians. Has there
been a subtle transition from a citizen's right to express his opinions to
the more abstract idea of the American public's right to know? And if so,
has it taken place without the benefit of adequately defined principles?
Where, for example, should the line be drawn between newsmen trying to dig
out a story and television reporters indulging their aggressions by
hectoring government officials? What should be the methods and standards
for checking the power of the media? Is it really healthy to have a process
that makes media bashing so tempting a game for politicians?
These questions are becoming more vexing because the American
political culture has given the media the right to raise issues about the
conduct of, say, candidates that would be off-limits for the politicians
themselves to address. The press and television can probe and use innuendo
in ways that are taboo for the politicians themselves. It was seen as
legitimate for the press to expose Senator Biden's propensity for
plagiarism but not for Governor Dukakis's aide to be involved in doing so.
There is, however, a cost for the freedom that the media have in this gray
area, for the practice does create a paranoid political climate in which
not only a President Lyndon Johnson but most politicians will feel they are
surrounded by enemies "out there." This can hardly be a healthy atmosphere
for democracy.
In order to sort out the rights and wrongs of such issues it is
necessary for researchers to give us a better understanding of exactly what
are the powers and the limitations of the media in shaping public opinion.
It is, of course, universally assumed that both the press and television
decisively influence public opinion. Why would so much be spent on
advertising if the media did not affect people's thinking and acting? Why
are academics so pleased to have their "op-ed" pieces published in the New
York Times? Is it because they believe they have influenced the flow of
real world events, or is it only the thrill of seeing their names in print?
Yet, in spite of such assumptions the precise nature of the power of
the press and the electronic media is not easily guaged. Certainly by
giving attention to particular people and events they create celebrities
and determine what will be the topics of the day in social discourse. There
are numerous studies documenting the power of the media in setting the
agendas of issues that will dominate public attention. But to what extent
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is this power just a transitory form of influence, a grasshoppoer
phenomenon, not to be confused with the sustained power that the three
conventional branches of government command?
This is the kind of question that not only needs to be asked but
repeatedly researched. I stress the idea of repeatedly. Indeed, on this
happy occasion of the inauguration of a major communications research
program, I should point out that the conclusions reached by the social
sciences are not to be confused with the permanent "laws" of the physical
sciences, and therefore the findings of yesterday's research may not hold
up under tomorrow's conditions. Indeed, one of the great disappointments of
the behavorial revolution in the social sciences has been that findings,
based on the most exacting standards of scientific work, have proved to
have disturbingly short half-lives. Human behavior is simply too sensitive
to time, place, and culture to follow unchanging and deterministic "laws."
Thus, while the rules of the scientific method place equal demands for
precision and rigor on the work of both the social and the physical
scientist, it is a sad fact that the findings of the social scientist
cannot have the same durability as the enduring and law-like findings of
the physical scientist.
In communications research this has meant that some of the most
venerated theories have to be regularly restudied and modified. For
example, one of the keystones of communications work, the two-step theory,
has come increasingly into question. This theory holds that most Americans
get the information that guides their political behavior through word of
mouth messages from opinion leaders and not dirctly from the media, and the
opinion leaders, in selecting out from the media what they pass on, slant
the information which the passive public receives. Scholars such as James
Short have shown that the changing character of the American occupational
structure has reduced the importance of opinion leaders and in the process
has created a more independent-minded public which gets much of its
information directly from the media, and particularly from television.8
Instead of masses of laborers in huge factories working shoulder to
shoulder with their union representatives, today's work places more often
have small groups of people or even individual workers who feel more
competent to interpret what they are exposed to in the media. Thus the rise
of the independent voter and the increase in split tickets.
All of this suggests growth in the power of the mass media. Yet once
we try to go beyond such a broad generalization, it requires a great deal
of sophistication to pinpoint the influence of the different forms of
media, as Donald Kinder has shown in his latest work.9 In particular
Kinder has discovered that television, in spite of the brevity of its news
coverage of individual stories, has considerably more influence than was
once suspected-especially in setting the agenda of issues for public
attention. Therefore the print media may no longer have quite the monopoly
it was once thought to have in influencing political thinking. Also so much
for the legal doctrine that broadcasting is for "entertainment" and not
politics.
The importance of television goes well beyond its obvious power to
deliver visual impact on the public mind, dramatizing some stories while
minimizing the importance of others. Television has also contributed to
making American politics an activity that is focussed almost entirely upon
the present. Events and concerns that obsessed the American public only a
few weeeks or months ago can be totally put out of mind as attention is
concentrated on what is new today. The attention span on issues in American
politics has been declining in recent years, with the result that the
agenda of issues now changes with startling rapidity. It may be far less
the personality of Ronald Reagan that tagged him the "Teflon president" and
more the nature of television that insures that no story will be long
lasting. Given the limited memory of the electronic media it should be
possible for any reasonably skilled politician to become a "Teflon
president."
The situation may be much more serious. The combination of the
technical characteristics of television as popular communication and the
regulations we have historically imposed upon it seems to be drastically
changing the nature of American politics -- as is all too apparent in this
year's presidential campaign. Is there any hope that American politics can
regain the vitality it once had when the dominant mode of communications
was an unfettered press? Now that television has become the main form of
communications for structuring national politics, are we going to have to
pay an exorbitantly high price for the folly of first dismissing electronic
communications as only "entertainment" and of then neutering it by
imprisoning it within bureaucratic definitions of the "public interest" and
the constraints of the "fairness doctrine"?
The price we pay is an ironical one, for the very neutralness of
television, when combined with the imperatives of brevity, has forced out
discussion of issues and elevated the playing to emotions. Professionalism
within the media once served to insure that the public got detailed
information about issues. Increasingly, however, the public has had to
depend largely upon essentially partisan sources for general information
about fundamental issues which cannot be captured in the evening newscasts.
The result is that we now have a strange political.atmosphere. At the
center there is a vividness of imagery but a blandness, indeed vacuity, of
ideas, but at the fringes there is shrill partisan voices seeking to be
heard, but there is also a sophisticated public that has learned to
discount the views of anyone who seems emotionally involved in a topic.
Against these discouraging developments, which I see as looming
large, there is the much more optimistic view, put forward by among others
Ithiel Pool, that advances in the electronic forms of communications,
including in particular cable television, can possibly open the door to
greater citizen participation in public affairs, and thus expand democracy.
In the past mass communications were generally seen as providing leaders
with the means to amplify their messages so as to reach ever larger
audiences, and thereby bring an entire population into national politics,
but always under the sway of the leaders. Now there are possibilities for
the public to communicate more effectively with their leaders and for
public officials to get direct information as to what is on the minds of
the citizens. F. Christopher Arterton has examined in detail a variety of
experiments in political participation and what he has called
"teledemocracy." 10 Among his conclusions are that there is nothing
deterministic in the technologies, and that if there is to be greater
popular participation through electronic communications it will be up to
the initiatives of both public officials and citizens. The potential for
pseudo-participation is great and there remains the possibility that the
new technologies will be used by the elites to manipulate public opinion.
This enduring potential of the media to manipulate public opinion
leads directly to the issue of bias on the part of the decision-makers in
the communications industry. Aaron Wildavsky in reviewing Kinder's work has
singled out the relationship of power and bias as a subject that deserves
much further research.11 He suggests that in theory there are four
possible relationships between the degree of power and the existence of
bias. First, there is the unlikely possibility that the media have little
influence and negligible bias, in which case the question becomes trivial.
If, secondly, the media do have little influence but are highly biased, the
result would be rather comical. If, however, the media turn out to be
powerful but also objective, then we would have the ideal situation as far
as much of communications theory goes. Finally, there is the disturbing
possibility, which Wildavsky believes is most likely, that the media are
powerful but also biased. Wildavsky suggests that as unfortunate as this
would be, researchers should examine this possibility with the same degree
of thoroughness as Kinder used in looking at the power of the media.
The study of bias is of course a tricky matter, for one person's bias
is another's objective truth. The polarities of left and right provide the
two ideological extremes for the charges of bias. The left, of course,
insists that the media are in the service of "monopoly capitalism", and
that they consistently suspresses important issues. The Marxists are thus
convinced that the media control the agenda of issues to favor the
interests of "capitalism," and that if the media would only try to "get
behind" the topics of the day they would come to the "real" explanation of
events which they are confident their Marxist doctrines have already
unveiled.12 The political right is for its part convinced that the news
industry is populated with devious and impassioned liberals. They sense
that by pounding away against what they call the "liberal press" they can
intimidate reporters.
Those who work in the media know that the relationship of economic
considerations and bias in reporting is far more subtle and complex than
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the Marxists imagine it to be. Richard Clurman, who for 20 years worked at
Time Inc. as writer and as chief of correspondents, makes the telling point
that the complex interactions between executive management and reporters
has been inadequately studied, and he believes that it is an area that
would be most revealing if examined. Instead of appeals to a
counter-ideology, Clurman recommends that the fight against bias can best
be done by, first, establishing the practice of the media systematically
reporting critically on themselves -- that is, more stories about how and
why certain stories were produced -- and, second, by providing more ways
for the public to respond to the coverage of the media so as to make the
media more aware of how they stand in the public eye.13
The people in the media are generally less disturbed by the
suggestion that they are slaves of capitalists and more troubled by the
opposite charge of succumbing to a liberal ideological bias -- a charge
that is not easy to disprove. Yet there are ways of exploring some of the
dimensions of bias. Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter, for example, have
carried out a major study that compares the opinions of a large sample of
journalists and scientists, both physicists and nuclear engineers, about
the safety of nuclear power plants.14 They discovered that the two groups
are poles apart in their understanding of risks. They did not inquire into
why the journalists had failed to check out the opinions of the physicists
or why the journalists are so much more fearful than the scientists. One
possibility would be to up-date Leo Rosten's study of the Washington press
corps of some thirty years ago in which he found out that the typical
journalist was a person who wanted to be close to power but did not want
the responsibilities of decision-making.15 Journalists thus enjoy the
mischief of things going wrong, of exposing the faults of others, and of
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observing the failing of those institutions in which people want to place
their faith. Another possible explanation of the Rothman and Lichter
findings, offered by Ann Crigler, is that the "squeaky wheel gets
attention" and therefore the journalists are attracted to those scientists
who are the most fearful of risks and prone to dramatize any possible
dangers.16
Countering Bias With Professionalism Requires Ethical Standards
The response of the media to charges of bias has been to assert the
ideals of professionalism associated with the evolution of journalism.
Unfortunately, however, the practice has generally been to treat
professionalism as largely a matter of "objectivity" or "neutralism," of
not taking sides, and it has not been seen in terms of achieving higher
standards.
The media, for example, will go to great lengths to cover both sides
of issues. The American public has consequently come to expect that
whenever their government is engaged in a controversy with another
government they will shortly be seeing on their television screens the
spokesmen for the other government, be it for the Ayatollah or the
Sandanistas or whoever. If the current practices had been followed a
generation ago, Hitler and Stalin would have had their "fair shakes" in
making their cases in the American media. The problem of course with this
approach is that it reduces political competition to a form of chess in
which "you play the white and I'll play black, and in the next round we'll
change around." Public affairs are thereby reduced to the politics of
spokesmen without any pretense of over-arching ethical standards. (Unless
this remark be taken as a slight of the McNeill/Lehrer program, let me
__·__·_ I~_:lji;i__m___·__ ____·_·~________~_
quickly add that that program deserves our praise, not least for its
constant demonstration that civility is a more effective way of prying out
the thoughts of officials than the abrasiveness of less competent
questioners.) This effort to resolve the problem of bias compels the media
to take the position that there really is no such thing as a collective or
national interest. Indeed, it often leads to the rather bizarre view that
Americans should not get passionate about their own national interest, but
should always be sensitive to the national interests of other countries.
There, of course, is nothing wrong in trying to see the other side's
point of view. But what is needed is the introduction of a higher ethical
perspective to help the public evaluate events and to judge the legitimacy
of U.S. policies. Professionalism should also include an awareness of the
concept of a collective interest that needs the support of the media. Those
working in the field of communications should have not difficulty
appreciating the concept of a collective interest because most of the
theorizing about the role of communications in political development in the
Third World has been premised on the reality of such a concept.
The Media and Nation-Building.
This position and the idea that the media should serve the collective
interest brings us to the third area I wish to deal with, that of the media
and political development in the Third World. I feel that we can make the
transition from American politics to the developing world because the two
great developments that stimulated the growth of communications research in
the post-World War II era were, first, the analysis of public opinion and
electoral behavior in democratic societies, and second, the possibilities
of using communications policies to facilitate the-development of the new
nations that emerged from the collapse of Western colonialism. The initial
pre-War interest in the study of communications came out of the problems of
understanding the potentials of propaganda associated with the First World
War and the subsequent rise of fascism and communism.
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s there was a great deal of
research on the possible uses of communications in speeding political and
economic development -- and indeed, Ithiel Pool first came to M.I.T. to
direct research on this very subject. There was considerable excitement in
the social sciences as scholars such as Daniel Lerner, Wilbur Schramm, and
Fred Frey developed theories that explored the potential of communications
for human and social development. Indeed, Karl Deutsch became a leading
innovator in the social sciences by developing theories about nationalism
and nation-building in which communications patterns were treated as the
key factor explaining historical developments.17
These theories stressed the possibilities of elites communicating new
values to their rural mass populations. It was assumed that modernizing
elites, in command of the appropriate knowledge, would be able to reach out
to their mass publics, most particularly the more traditional rural
populations, and through the mass media teach them ideas and skills that
would bring them into the modern world. It was believed at the time that
this was precisely what Mao Zedong was doing in China. Indeed, it was even
thought that Mao had certain advantages because the Chinese people were cut
off from any other distracting forms of communications and had only the
messages that the regime deemed appropriate for national development. Put
simply, the idea was that the mass media made it possible for an elite to
target an audience and then transmit its own ideas to the minds of the
masses. Hence, the Third World was encouraged to saturate its radio and
television broadcasts with uplift programs designed by government
bureaucrats, a prospect that should have made us shudder at the time.
Needless to say, the potential of the media conceived of in these
terms, was misjudged. Although we had at the time considerable evidence
that the communications process is a much more complex phenomenon, and that
audiences react to more than just the explicit or intended messages.
Moreover, there are always a host of other channels of communications in
any society that provide contexts for whatever the mass media may be
disseminating. This utilitarian approach of the mass media in the service
of social advancement produced unrelieved earnest and humorless moralizing,
preachy programming that has become the hallmark of public broadcasting in
country after country of the developing world. The concept of
purposefulness in social science theories became translated into dutiful
dedication in the work of bureaucrats, who as converts were often
unquestioning true believers.
By the 1970s it was becoming apparent that the theories were in
danger of slipping over the edge into the realm of caricature.
Interestingly, the main evidence for the limitations of the targeting
theory of communications in the service of development came from China. The
advent of Deng Xiaoping's reforms and the end of Maoism revealed that all
the efforts of the late Chairman to transform the Chinese masses into
"Socialist New Men" had been a major failure, for the Chinese people
remained essentially Chinese. Indeed, the effort had been in many respects
counter-productive. The regime's monopoly of the mass media had made the
people distrustful of official pronouncements and strong believers in
informal channels of communication. People looked to the official media for
signals about factional conflicts within the elite and for guidance on what
to do to keep on the good side of authority. But few people totally
abandoned their private thinking to accept the full content of the official
media. They practiced instead the great Chinese art of feigned compliance,
of conforming on the surface with the offically defined consensus while in
their private thoughts and acts they continued to seek, as best they could,
their own self interest.
Interestingly, the growth of informal communication patterns in China
was greatly advanced by the sons and daughters of high level cadres who
discovered that they could profitably produce secret newsletters which
passed on the gossip they picked up in family conversations. These became
known as xiao-dao xiao-xi or "By-roads News." Others soon picked up the
practice, and as a result the informal spreading of information became a
significant small industry which still continues today. We now know that
students in China, in spite of being cut off from open sources of
information, have been able to learn a great deal about democracy and the
way of life in other countries through these informal channels of
communication. The government finds that it has to translate a great deal
of information from abroad which it classifies as nei-bu or "restricted,"
but it must allow access to the materials to large numbers of people who
then systematically pass on what is supposed to be secret.
There is evidence that much the same processes have been taking place
in the other societies that went overboard in trying to target
communications. The result of all of this is a strange paradox: in the
industrialized countries where service industries are on the rise we find a
decline in the two-step flow as more and more people feel comfortable in
making their own decisions from their exposure to the mass media, but in
the developing world it is the other way around as.more and more people
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have come to rely upon informal, word of mouth processes of communication.
Paradoxically, the enthusiasm of the American theorists of
communications and development spread to the elites of many of the Third
World, but with a strange boomerang effect. One might have thought that
such elites would have developed doubts about the theories after they tried
to put them into practice in changing the behavior of their own peoples.
Instead many of them have clung to the theories, only shifting their
application to the arena of international communications. Relying on their
interpretation of communication theory, they argued that if those who
controlled the media could target messages to influence the behavior of
mass audiences, then they had the right to conclude that this describe
exactly what was taking place in the world at large, in which the Western
news services, as the manipulating elite, monopolized the flow of
information across international boundaries, thereby affecting the behavior
of the people in the Third World.18 The result has been the call for a
"New Information Order" which has, of course, been a direct attack on the
integrity of the existing news services. The complaint brings us back to
the issue of bias in the Western media. The paradox is even more ironic
because the Third World elites who pushed hardest for a "New Order" were,
in spite of their "socialist" and "progressive" rhetoric, generally opposed
to significant social change in their own countries and hostile to the
liberal bias they see in the Western mass media and the news services. They
have not wanted their publics to be exposed to what the Chinese have called
"Bourgeois liberalism."
There is a final irony in this story of applied social science
research. How was it possible that the generation who developed the
theories of communications and development, of which I am a part, which was
brought up in the Depression and came of age in World War II, how could we
of all the generations have been so earnestly purposeful in describing the
role of the mass media? How could we have forgotten that for us the mass
media meant listening every Sunday night to Jack Benny, Allen's Ally,
Fibber McGee and Molly and all the other wonderful programs of the era of
great radio? The rest of the week we cemented our spirit of community by
repeating the jokes in schools and work places. We further strengthened our
bonds of community, in the face of adversity, by flocking to the movies in
response to a star system in which we could thrill together at seeing
Katherine Hepburn, Betty Grable, Ginger Rogers, Fred Astaire, and Clark
Gable acting the parts of Katherine Hepburn, Betty Grable, Ginger Rogers,
Fred Astaire and Clark Gable. So, when we came to think about the problems
of nation-building how could we have forgotten all of this?
I am struck with how many of our generation still seem to miss the
point as they worry about what people in other countries will think of
America as they watch our television programs on their local networks. Such
people seem to fail to sense what is going on when people all over the
world have shared emotions about the episodes of "Dallas", are laughing
together with the "Hill Street Blues", and are caught up in the antics of
"Miami Vice". Are not these the functional equivalents of the Jack Benny
Show and Allen's Alley, and what are the implications of an audience that
crosses national boundaries being brought together in a joyful shared
experience? I am reminded of an incident a few years ago in Asia when I
was with a delegation of American academics. During a break in the
conference we happened to be joined by a group of non-academic Americans,
who quickly made friends with the Asians and before we knew it they were
laughing together and slapping their thighs at the-shared memories of
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episodes of "Dallas" and other American television shows. The American
academics were silent, completely out of it. Yet, as I remember the group,
they were all people who in their youth must have enjoyed the Sunday radio
programs, and probably to this day some of them would insist that those
shows were culturally significant, perhaps even a high art form. Of course
they weren't. They were instead socially important in community building,
as perhaps are today's television programs.
The Challenge of Communications Research.
In closing, let me say that I hope that by touching upon these three
large topics I have been able to convey to you some feeling for the great
challenge inherent in communications research. This is a field that calls
for collaboration among scholars with a variety of interests and skills.
The central thrust of my review of three quite different aspects of the
problems of communications and freedom is that while technology has been
important in advancing our abilities to transmit information, public policy
should not be dictated by presumed considerations as to any technological
imperatives. What is needed is high sensitivity to the social and political
significance of changing communications technologies. Radio and television
have changed the character of the American political process. But the
results do not have to be the kind of empty political "dialogues" we seem
to be having in this election year.
Students of communications need to understand what is taking place at
the frontiers of technological advances, but it is even more important for
them to develop a strong sense of professionalism that goes well beyond
being just technically competent. There is a need for professionalism that




to both individual freedom and the collective interest. The goal of an
advanced communications society should be that of free men and women in a
society that knows the values of community. For the magic of modern
electronic communications is that it can expand and deepen the precious
sense of community that binds people together and makes freedom into
something more than just isolated autonomy.
To train people to work in the contemporary world of communications
there must, therefore, be extensive cooperation among people from many
parts of a university. There is a need for those with an understanding of
our legal processes and of governmental regulation procedures. The door
needs to be opened to the information that can only come from scientists
and engineers who are informed about the next developments in
communications technologies. There is a major place in the research center
for sociologists and psychologists who can carry out systematic analysis of
public opinion and attitude formation and cognitive processes. More
importantly, there must be people who will openly take on the challenge of
thinking through the ethical issues that should be at the heart of
professionalism in this field. There should be no set boundaries on what is
to be researched, for communications lies at the heart of human behavior
and its study needs to encompass all the essential dimensions of the human
condition.
This is the great challenge that the new Stanton/Heiskell Center will
be taking up in the years ahead. I want to wish you great success, and to
thank you once again for giving me this opportunity to address you and to
pay my respects to the memory of Ithiel de Sola Pool.
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